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GENDER BALANCE AND THE MEANINGS OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE IN
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA
JENNIE E. BURNET
ABSTRACT
Across Africa, many countries have taken initiatives to increase the participation and
representation of women in governance. Yet it is unclear what meaning these initiatives have in
authoritarian, single-party states like Rwanda. Since seizing power in 1994, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front has taken many steps to increase the participation of women in politics such as
creating a Ministry of Gender, organizing women’s councils at all levels of government, and
instituting an electoral system with reserved seats for women in the national parliament. This
article explores the dramatic increase in women’s participation in public life and representation
in governance and the increasing authoritarianism of the Rwandan state under the guise of
‘democratization.’ The increased political participation of women in Rwanda represents a
paradox in the short-term: as their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence
policy-making has decreased. In the long-term, however, increased female representation in
government could prepare the path for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy
because of a transformation in political subjectivity. The lasting repercussions of the 1994
genocide, the material realities of life in post-genocide Rwanda, and the greater representation of
females in public life and political office have promoted a great deal of change in cultural and
social conceptions of gender roles. With these changes has come a greater acceptance of women
in positions of authority and of women as independent agents in the public sphere. This
transformation in political subjectivity could prepare women to take a meaningful role in
government should a real transition to democracy take place in Rwanda.

1

GENDER BALANCE AND THE MEANINGS OF WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE IN
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA
JENNIE E. BURNET
Just nine years after a genocide in which at least 500,000 Rwandans, primarily Tutsi as
well as politically-moderate Hutu, lost their lives, Rwandans went to the polls to elect a national
parliament.1 In September 2003, the population elected 39 women to the 80 member Chamber
of Deputies through a tiered electoral system. Rwanda replaced Sweden as the country with the

Jennie E. Burnet (j.burnet@louisville.edu) is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Louisville
(USA). She has been conducting research on gender, ethnicity, and reconciliation in Rwanda since 1996. This is a
much revised version of a paper presented in October 2006 at a conference on ‘Gender and democratization in
societies at war’ at Colgate University. The author wishes to thank the participants in the conference, notably
Maureen Hays-Mitchell and Jill Irvine, for their feedback and comments. In addition, the thoughtful and insightful
feedback from the anonymous reviewers and editors of African Affairs has been indispensable in improving the
article and honing the argument. The author would like to acknowledge financial support from the University of
Louisville, the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the United States Institute for Peace, the United States Department of Education,
and the Institute for the Study of World Politics of the Fund for Peace.
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Estimates of how many people died in the 1994 genocide vary widely. While how many died is irrelevant to

whether or not the killings in Rwanda in 1994 were genocide, the issue is highly politicized so it is necessary to
indicate the sources. The number I use here comes from Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide
in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, New York, NY, 1999), p. 15. For more on the numbers of dead see Scott Straus’s
analysis in Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, NY, 2006), pp. 41-64.
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highest percentage of females in its national legislature.2 Many observers, including journalists,
the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the Minister of Gender and Women in Development,
representatives of international NGOs and the United Nations, heralded the representation of
women in the Rwandan parliament as the dawn of a new, more ‘peaceful,’ and ‘equitable’ age in
Rwandan politics.3 In the past 10 years, women’s participation in governance across the
continent has increased dramatically. Several countries, including Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia,
and South Africa, have instituted reserved seats for women or quota systems to insure the
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Gretchen Bauer and Hannah Evelyn Britton, ‘Women in African Parliaments: A Continental Shift?,’ in Hannah

Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO,
2006), p. 1. Since the parliamentary elections in 2003, the Rwandan Parliament has had the highest percentage of
female representation in the world, ranging from 48.8 percent in 2003 to 42.3 percent in September 2006. The 2003
statistics are reported in Timothy Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality or Serving an Authoritarian State?’, in
Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments, (Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Boulder, CO, 2006), p. 144, and they are widely cited by the Rwandan government in speeches and press
conferences. The 2006 statistics are based on the author’s analysis of the Rwandan National Parliament membership
list published on its website http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/ (25 September 2006).
3

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 133. For example, see Elizabeth Powley, ‘Strengthening

Governance: The Role of Women in Rwanda's Transition’, (report, Women Waging Peace / Hunt Alternatives Fund,
Cambridge, MA, 2003), available at
<http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/10_strengthening_governance_the_role_of_women_in_rwanda_s_transi
tion.pdf>, (21 January 2008), and see ‘Address by her Excellency President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at the official
opening of the Women Parliamentarians International Conference,’ (UNDP-Rwanda website, Kigali, Rwanda, 23
February 2007) available at http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Women_conf_Speeches_23-02-2007.pdf, (9 August
2007)..
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representation of women. A growing literature on women in governance has begun to assess the
impact of women’s increased representation.4
In this article, I explore two divergent, yet related phenomena in Rwanda. The first is the
dramatic increase in women’s participation in public life and governance. Since taking power in
1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government have taken many steps
to increase the participation of women in politics, creating a Ministry of Gender, organizing
women’s councils at the cell, sector, district and provincial levels, and instituting an electoral
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See for example, Hannah Evelyn Britton and Gretchen Bauer, Women in African Parliaments (Lynne Rienner

Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2006); Hannah Evelyn Britton, Women in the South African Parliament : From Resistance
to Governance (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, 2005); Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, No
Shortcuts to Power: African Women in Politics and Policy Making (Zed Books, Cape Town, South Africa, 2003);
Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Expanding “Civil Society”: Women and Political Space in Contemporary Uganda,”
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36, 2 (1998), pp. 84-107; Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Gender, Political Participation
and the Transformation of Associational Life in Uganda and Tanzania,’ African Studies Review 37, 1 (1994), pp.
107-131; Ali Mari Tripp, ‘The Politics of Autonomy and Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Ugandan Women's
Movement,’ Journal of Modern African Studies 39, 1 (2001), pp. 101-28; Aili Tripp, Dior Konate, and Colleen
Lowe-Morna, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: On the Fast Track to Women's Political Representation,’ in Drude Dahlerup
(ed.), Women, Quotas and Politics, (Routledge, London, 2006), pp. 112-37; Aili Mari Tripp, Women & Politics in
Uganda (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 2000); Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Women in Movement
Transformations in African Political Landscapes,’ International Feminist Journal of Politics 5, 2 (2003), pp. 233-55;
Drude Dahlerup, Women, Quotas and Politics, (Routledge, London, 2006); Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Women's Movements
and Challenges to Neopatrimonial Rule: Preliminary Observations from Africa,’ Development & Change 32, 1
(2001), pp. 33-54; Sylvia Tamale, When Hens Begin to Crow : Gender and Parliamentary Politics in Uganda
(Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1999).
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system with gender quotas for the national parliament.5 Discussions about female political
participation in post-genocide Rwanda tend to assume that increased participation by women will
lead to greater gender equality and a ‘better,’ more peaceful society, yet these changes have not
necessarily increased the political power of women or led to more egalitarian notions of
citizenship. The second phenomenon I will explore is the ways in which the Rwandan state has
become increasingly authoritarian under the guise of ‘democratization.’ As a result of this
increasing authoritarianism, female political participation represents a paradox in the short-term:
as their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In
the long-term, however, the increased participation of women could prepare the path for their
meaningful participation in a genuine democracy. This article is based on ethnographic research
conducted in urban and rural Rwanda between 1997 and 2007, including over a hundred
interviews with the leaders and members of women’s civil society organizations, as well as
ongoing documentary research conducted since 1996.6

5

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is the current ruling party in Rwanda. Founded in Uganda in the late 1980s,

the RPF grew out of earlier organizations of Tutsi exiles (such as the UNAR) whose intent was to return to Rwanda
through armed resistance. The RPF ended the genocide in July 1994 by taking control of the country.
6

The research was conducted over a series of field trips to Rwanda. Data were gathered through focus groups,

formal interviews, conversations, questionnaires, participant observation, and documentary research among other
means. In 1997 and 1998, the author made brief field trips (4 months and 3 months). In 1999 through 2001, the
author conducted ethnographic research via participant observation in a rural community in southern Rwanda for 12
months and in a middle class neighbourhood in the capital city for 12 months. During that time, she made numerous
trips to other regions of the country to conduct additional interviews and gather data. In 2002, she made two trips to
Rwanda of six weeks each, and in 2003 a trip of two weeks. In 2007, she spent 4 weeks in Rwanda conducting

5

‘Democratization’ in Rwanda, old and new
What foreign diplomats, certain political scientists, and the Rwandan government have
called ‘democratization’ in Rwanda is predicated on a linear transition paradigm where
authoritarianism gives way to democracy, human rights abuses to the rule of law, and corruption
to good governance.7 According to this paradigm, the democratic transition process passes
through a series of distinct stages: opening, breakthrough and consolidation.8 In diplomatic and
development circles, and particularly US foreign policy, elections are the fundamental
component of democratic transition, often to the exclusion of other important aspects of
democracy defined in political theory. Under this paradigm, Rwanda’s transition started well
before the 1994 genocide with a political opening in 1989.
In 1989, several political parties, which had been dormant under the single-party state
and dictatorship of President Habyarimana, re-emerged and began demanding political
liberalisation. Along with a few civil society organizations that were also pushing for change,
their pleas coincided with increasing pressure in the international community for authoritarian
states to democratize. In many cases, this pressure tied political reforms to aid money, a
particularly sensitive issue for the Rwandan government, as the country was almost entirely

interviews and focus groups with women’s organizations, women members of government, and women leaders of
civil society organizations.
7

Filip Reyntjens, ‘Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: Problematising “Liberation” and “Democratisation” ’, Third World

Quarterly 27, 6 (2006), pp. 1103-17. See also Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm,’ Journal of
Democracy 13, 1 (2002), pp. 5-21.
8

Alicia Phillips Mandaville and Peter P. Mandaville, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Democratization and Democracy

Assistance,’ Development 50. 1 (2007), pp 5-13.
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dependent on foreign aid. The movement by CSOs was consolidated in September 1990 with the
publication of a memorandum, ‘For multiparty politics and democracy’.9
On 1 October 1990 the country entered a civil war when the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) attacked Rwanda, and the civil war strongly influenced the political transition. Founded
in Uganda in the late 1980s, the RPF’s stated intention was to liberate the country from President
Habyarimana’s dictatorship. The civil war continued throughout the early 1990s until
Habyarimana, facing dramatic losses as well as continued pressure from donors, was forced to
the negotiating table. The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords brought an official end to hostilities and
outlined a transition plan to move the country to multiparty politics and democratic elections.
The transition, which had been limping along, was brought to a dramatic and violent halt
in April 1994 when Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down by unknown
assailants. Immediately, Hutu extremists took control of the government and perpetrated a
genocide against Tutsi and others defined as ‘enemies’ of the state. At the same time, the RPF
resumed the civil war against the government army, which was also involved in the genocide.
The genocide ended when the RPF took military control of the majority of the territory, driving
the Hutu-extremist government, militias, and army into exile, along with nearly two million
civilians.
On 19 July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the
‘Government of National Unity,’ whose composition reaffirmed the RPF’s commitment to power
sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords. The RPF announced that the transitional government
would remain in power for five years. As part of its reconstruction efforts, the Transitional
Government undertook an ideological programme called ‘national unity and reconciliation’ to

9

Filip Reyntjens, L'afrique Des Grands Lacs En Crise. Rwanda, Burundi 1988-1994 (Karthala, Paris, 1994), p. 305.
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build a ‘New Rwanda,’ a nation of one people who refused the ‘genocidal ideology’ of the past.10
By 1995, however, it appeared that the RPF might not make good on its promises. Reports of
extrajudicial executions, ‘disappearances,’ and several massacres of civilians emerged
throughout late 1994 and 1995. In August 1995, several prominent Hutu politicians, including
Hutu members of the RPF, fled into exile for fear for their lives. Hutu elites continued to flee
through the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2000, a wave of departures among Tutsi genocide
survivors began.11
In 1998, the RPF had announced that the transition period would be extended five
additional years to ensure the country’s security and a peaceful democratization process. The
Party justified its position by citing multiparty politics as one of the principal causes of the rise
of Hutu extremism and the 1994 genocide. This second round of ‘democratization’ was officially
launched in 2001 when district level elections were held and a Constitutional Commission was
appointed. In 2003, the new constitution was approved by national referendum in May,
presidential elections were held in August, and parliamentary elections in September.

10

Jennie E. Burnet, ‘Whose Genocide? Whose Truth? Representations of victim and perpetrator in Rwanda’, in

Alex Laban Hinton and Kevin O’Neill (eds), Genocide: Truth, Memory and Representation (Duke University Press,
Durham, NC, in press).
11

Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: the Search for Security and Human Rights Abuses’, (report, Human Rights

Watch, New York, NY, 2000), available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan00404.htm#P121_15300> (20 January 2008) and <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan00406.htm#P182_27970> (20 January 2008). pp. 121, 182.
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Since this most recent ‘democratization’ process began in 1998, the RPF-regime has
become more authoritarian.12 This so-called transition ‘was in fact tightly controlled and
resulted in greater consolidation of power by the RPF, even as it gave an illusion of power
distribution’.13 In the elections, RPF officials carefully selected candidates, and threatened or
intimidated anyone else seeking office.14 Local and national elections have been orchestrated
from the ground up with the RPF’s pre-selected candidates assured of winning.15 This
consolidation ‘has been accompanied by an increasing intolerance for independent expression
and political dissent’.16 The RPF regime has systematically suppressed independent civil society
organizations (particularly local human rights organizations) and destroyed any potential
opposition political parties.17

12

Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,’ African Affairs 103 (2004), p. 411;

Filip Reyntjens, ‘Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda’; Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’.
13

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 146.

14

Ibid., p. 147; International Crisis Group, ‘ “Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the

March 2001 District Elections,’ (Report, International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium, 2001).
15

The orchestrated nature of elections is an open secret in Rwanda today. In interviews conducted in 2007,

numerous citizens confirmed that while elections usually have a minimum of three candidates, the outcome is
always predetermined. One interviewee recounted a story of an election in an umudugudu (‘village,’ the smallest
administrative subdivision in Rwanda following the administrative reorganization of January 2006) in the capital,
Kigali, where the citizens failed to elect the pre-selected candidate. The elections official who was overseeing the
election declared, ‘No, no, no! You haven’t done it right. Let’s try again to see if you can do what we’ve asked.’
16

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 146.

17

Among the first human rights organizations to be suppressed was the umbrella, CLADHO, which was infiltrated

and dismantled from within in 1996. The most recent was LIPRODHOR, which was the only local human rights
organization to report critically on the RPF regime and RPA. In 2003, the members of Parliament denounced

9

To quell protest from the diplomatic and international aid communities, the RPF has
dressed its increasingly authoritarian governance in democratic clothing by promoting its
policies as the best methods to ensure ‘security’ and ‘good governance’. In addition, the regime
has increased the participation of all citizens in the political system through an elaborate local
level administration, as well as a complicated, tiered electoral system for the Parliament and
presidency. Finally, the regime has increased the representations of under-represented groups,
particularly women and youth.
The RPF and women in governance
Although the RPF was made up of Rwandan exiles in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and
Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) as well as Rwandans from inside the country that
left to join their fight, its core leadership grew up in refugee camps in Uganda. As Longman
notes, ‘The Ugandan origins of the RPF have deeply influenced its policies since taking power,
including its policies on women’s rights and inclusion.’18 President Paul Kagame and other RPF
insiders had been officers in Museveni’s National Resistance Movement in Uganda and their

LIPRODHOR as ‘promoting divisionism’ and a ‘genocidal ideology’ and called for a parliamentary commission to
investigate it and several other NGOS. Virtually all of LIPRODHOR’s leadership and senior members fled Rwanda
in June, July or August of 2003. While LIPRODHOR still exists, its current members and staff are members of the
RPF who toe the party line. In 2001, the RPF regime quashed an initiative by former President (and former RPF
member) Pasteur Bizimungu to found a new political party, charging him and his associates with treason. In 2003,
the MDR was completely banned when a parliamentary commission found it guilty of promoting divisionism and a
genocide ideology. This nail in the coffin lid followed the internal destruction of the party begun by Anastase
Gasana in 1999.
18

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 140.
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experiences influenced the organization and tactics of the RPF.19 The policies of Museveni and
the NRM have continued to influence RPF policy in the post-genocide period. RPF policies visà-vis the inclusion of women in governance seem closely modelled on those of Museveni and the
NRM. Museveni and the NRM took a two pronged approach in Uganda: (1) they mainstreamed
women within the NRM and appointed women to important posts in the cabinet and Supreme
Court, and (2) they set aside reserved seats for women in the legislature.20 The Ugandan election
structure is based on a complex combination of direct and indirect elections and an electoral
college system.21 Unlike Rwanda, however, Uganda has much greater freedom of expression
and a more robust independent press.22
Similar to the NRM, the RPF mainstreamed women from the beginning, including them
in both the political and armed wings of the Front during the armed struggle from 1990-1994. In
this way, it distinguished itself from the opposition parties and the state MRND party in Rwanda.

19

Ibid.

20

Aili Mari Tripp, ‘Uganda: Agents of Change for Women's Advancement?,’ in Hannah Evelyn Britton and

Gretchen Bauer (eds), Women in African Parliaments, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2006), p. 112.
21

Ibid., pp. 120-1.

22

Freedom House ranked Accountability and Public Voice in Uganda 3.99 out of 7 (where 0 is the least free and 7 is

the most free) in 2006, whereas for Rwanda in 2005 it was only 1.48 out of 7. For Uganda, see Nelson Kesfir,
‘Country Report – Uganda’ in Sanja Tatic and Christopher Waller (eds), Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom
House, New York, 2007) available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=7&ccrpage=31&ccrcountry=127 (21 January
2008). For Rwanda, see Sara Rakita, ‘Country Report – Rwanda’ in Sanja Tatic and Christopher Waller (eds),
Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House, New York, 2007) available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=140&edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=105 (21 January 08).
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Since taking power, the RPF has ‘publicly demonstrated a strong commitment to expanding
rights and representation for women’.23 In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF took numerous
steps to increase female participation in governance. Following its victory, it appointed women
to high profile positions in the new government, as ministers, secretaries of state, Supreme Court
justices, and parliamentarians. As part of the reorganization of the executive branch, they created
the Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Affairs (MIGEFASO). For the first time, Rwanda
had a ministry dedicated not just to women, but also to gender. The ministry was reorganized in
1999 and renamed ‘the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development’ (MIGEPROF).24 The
ministry’s central mandates have been to integrate gender analytical frameworks into all policies
and legislation, to reinforce knowledge of gender analytical matrices within state structures
(including local administrative structures, the ministries, legislature, and judiciary) via training
and education, and to promote gender equity.25
In early 1998, MIGEPROF organized ‘nationwide elections’26 for representative
leadership among women at all levels of government administration, from the cell up to the

23

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 141.

24

In French, Le Ministère du Genre et la Promotion Féminine (MIGEPROF), and in Kinyarwanda, ‘Minisiteri

y’Iterabmere ry’Umunyarwandakazi.’ The Kinyarwanda title of the Ministry is literally, ‘The Ministry for the
Promotion of the Female Rwandan.’
25

Judithe Kanakuze, ‘Le Rôle De La Femme Dans Le Processus De Démocratisation Au Rwanda’ (paper presented

at the Séminaire sur l'observation électorale par la société civile rwandaise / POER, Kigali, Rwanda, August 5, 2004
2004), p. 4. Interviews by the author 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001.
26

It is debatable whether the term, ‘elections,’ is appropriate as they were held in open-air plenaries where women

were asked to queue behind the candidate ‘of their choice.’ With the degree of social, political, and military control
in Rwandan society, it is doubtful that anyone’s choice was freely made. Nonetheless, this style of ‘election’
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national level.27 Initially called ‘grassroots women structures’ and later renamed ‘women’s
councils,’ the official purposes of the women’s councils were manifold, including to promote
women’s interests in development, to advise local governance structures on women’s issues, and
to teach women how to participate in politics. In fact, the women’s councils were the first to
elect members of Parliament in 1998 when they elected two Women’s Representatives.28 The
women’s councils continued to elect these representatives until the transition to the new
structures outlined in the 2003 Constitution. The women’s councils were joined by local
leadership representing the entire population elected nationwide in 1999.
Yet, in 1998, most rural Rwandans (male or female, and even including some women
who are members of them) did not understand the mission of most of the women’s councils.29
Outside the few communes where NGOs were implementing women-in-development projects
and used the structures to mobilize women, these structures existed in name only, or simply

became the standard for local level elections when ‘democratization’ was initiated by the Transitional Government
in 1999.
27

One cell is composed of roughly 100-200 households. Rwandan administrative structure is extremely hierarchical

and penetrates to the most basic level. The levels from smallest to largest are: ten houses (nyumbakumi), cell
(akagare), sector (umurenge), district (akarere), province (intara), and national (igihugu). The names of certain of
these designations were changed in English and Kinyarwanda with the administrative reorganizations of December
2000 and January 2006..
28

The 1998 elections for women’s leaders were the model for local elections in 1999. In both elections, the

population queued publicly behind the candidate ‘of their choice.’ The panel of candidates was selected minutes
before the voting. There were no campaigns and no public debate about the candidates.
29

The exception being certain positions that mirrored the appointed administrative positions (responsable and

conseiller) that they replaced.
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served as a channel to disseminate government directives from the top to the bottom. They were
mere symbols of inclusion, which appeared to be in line with foreign aid ideas, rather than
‘grassroots structures’ feeding the will of the people upwards in the governance hierarchy.
Cognisant of the lack of clear purpose for the women’s councils, in 1999 the Ministry announced
the implementation of women’s development funds to be distributed through these structures as
loans to finance income-generating projects. These funds were intended to penetrate to the
lowest level (cell) of the administration, that is, directly to the ‘grassroots.’ In most communities
where I conducted interviews between 1999 and 2001, local women did not know these funds
existed or whether they were functioning in their communities. Generally, only a few elite
women (who also held positions with the women’s grassroots structure at the commune level)
knew anything about the funds.
Perhaps the area where the RPF’s pro-woman policies are most evident is in the
legislative branch. Before the resumption of the civil war in 1994, few women had ever served
as parliamentarians (see Table 1). The first Transitional National Parliament (TNP) appointed in
1994, included 10 women, including 3 of the 13 RPF deputies.30 Between 1994 and 2003,
members of the TNP were appointed by the Political Party Forum (a body widely perceived as a
mechanism for RPF dominance) after being nominated by the political parties included in the
government. Over time, the number of women in parliament increased (see Table 1). By 1999
over one quarter of parliamentarians were women and before parliamentary elections in 2003,
women held 25.7 percent of seats in parliament.31 The 2003 Constitution in Rwanda set aside 30
percent of seats in the parliament and all other decision-making bodies for women. President

30

Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 144.

31

Ibid.

14

Kagame and key ministry officials have ‘repeatedly articulated strong support for women’s role
in government and society’.32 [Table 1 goes here]
These revolutionary steps to increase female representation in governance have brought
many accolades for President Paul Kagame and the RPF. In January 2007, Kagame was selected
as the winner of the 2007 African Gender Award.33 He was lauded for his leadership in efforts
to integrate ‘women into the reconstruction process,’ to ‘fight against gender-based violence,’
and to protect ‘the rights of women and girls to equal education, economic development and
ownership of property, particularly in rural zones’.34 In February 2007, the Forum of Rwandan
Women Parliamentarians hosted an international conference entitled, ‘Gender, Nation Building:
The Role of Parliaments’.35 Supported by the United Nations Development Programme, this
conference brought over 400 delegates from around the world to Kigali to discuss the role of
parliaments in promoting gender equality as a fundamental component of development.36 Among
the distinguished participants in the conference was Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the

32

Ibid., p. 141.

33

Kagame received the award on 12 December 2007 at a ceremony in Dakar, Senegal. ‘African Gender Forum and

Award,’ African Gender Award website, December 2007, available at http://www.africangenderawards.org/ (21
January 2008).
34

‘2007 Award Laureate,’ African Gender Award website, January 2007, available at

http://www.africangenderawards.org/award1.html, (8 August 2007).
35

‘Background Paper: “Walking the Talk”,’ UNDP-Rwanda website, 22 February 2007.

http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Women_Conf_22-23_02_2007.html, (8 August 2007).
36

‘Women Parliamentarians International Conference under the theme “Gender, Nation Building and the Role of

Parliaments”,’ UNDP-Rwanda website, 23 February 2007.
http://www.unrwanda.org/undp/Newsroom_story11.html, (8 August 2007).

15

first African woman ever elected president, whose speech to the plenary highlighted the
usefulness of the RPF’s pro-woman policies and its relatively new role as host to international
conferences:
[government policies have encouraged] women not only to partake of the democratic
process but also to be full participants in the governance of their societies and countries.
This has facilitated networking at the grass-roots, local, national and international levels
thereby creating an appropriate political environment that continues to nurture what you
can proudly call your home grown democracy. … In light of such achievements against
the backdrop of your recent political past, we congratulate and encourage you for having
risen up to the challenge of creating a network that has focused on a process of nation
building underpinned by a gender perspective.37
Beyond an ideological commitment to promoting women’s rights, the RPF’s pro-woman policies
gain a great deal of support for the RPF-regime from key decision-makers and influential
personalities, such as President Sirleaf, in the international community. Influential international
delegates to the numerous conferences in Kigali rarely know the details of recent Rwandan
political history, and thus they develop a one-sided view of the RPF as courageous defenders of
the Rwandan people who stopped the genocide, promoted female equality, and embarked on a
path to democracy. As a result, many delegates leave Kigali as strong believers in and defenders
of President Kagame and the RPF-regime.
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Beyond these influential passers-by, the RPF’s pro-woman policies, as well as its efforts
to ‘modernize’ and ‘rationalize’ Rwandan society and the economy, give members of the
diplomatic corps in Kigali liberty to overlook the regime’s authoritarianism and human rights
abuses. When human rights observers present evidence of serious human rights violations, such
as extrajudicial executions or ‘disappearances’, diplomats often respond with an attitude of ‘at
least, it’s not genocide,’ and then enumerate RPF successes, such as promoting women’s rights.38
Women in civil society
In post-genocide Rwanda, women’s organizations have taken a leading role in rebuilding
society and in helping women rebuild their lives. The proliferation of women’s organizations
since the late 1990s in Rwanda ‘seems nothing short of remarkable’.39 Women’s organizations
seemed to step ‘in to fill a social void in the post-genocide period’; they helped to meet women’s
basic needs (food, clothing and shelter) and make up for the missing kin and social support
systems destroyed in the genocide. 40 While none of these changes happened overnight,
women’s organizations have indeed served the needs of thousands of individual women.41 The
growth of women’s organizations, as well as their mission to help the most vulnerable people in
society (women and children), positioned them as among the most active sector of civil society
between 1994 and 2003.
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Newbury and Baldwin attribute the proliferation of women’s organizations in Rwanda to
four key factors: the dire crisis women faced in the aftermath of the genocide, the historical
vigour of women’s grassroots organizations and farming cooperatives, monetary and technical
support provided by the international community, and the policies of the Rwandan government.42
As detailed above, women had little choice but to recreate their lives from ‘less than nothing,’ as
more than one female genocide survivor described it to me. Yet the women’s movement in
Rwanda predates the genocide.
Early in the post-colonial period, the government of the First Republic supported social
centres (foyers sociaux) for women in each prefecture. These centres focused on the needs of
rural women, such as literacy and health education, but they also provided opportunities for
leadership to the educated women who staffed them.43 While the government of the Second
Republic largely excluded women from governance or key posts in the ministries, farming
cooperatives and grassroots-level church-related groups grew in number, thanks in part to the
influx of international funding and technical assistance aimed at rural development.44
Following the Third United Nations Conference on Women, held in Nairobi in 1985, a
women’s movement began to emerge in Rwanda.45 Several national women’s organizations were
founded in the late 1980s, including Duterimbere, a women’s banking and micro-lending
cooperative modelled on the Grameen Bank, Haguruka, an advocacy group for women and
children’s legal rights, and Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le développement rural, an
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organization that provided technical assistance to rural women’s organizations. Following
pressure from the nascent women’s movement, the Habyarimana government created the
Ministry for the Promotion of Women and the Family, whose primary mandate was to promote
economic development to improve the status of women and children, in 1992.46 The first woman
prime minister in Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingimana, a member of the MDR opposition party, was
appointed in 1993.47
Following the genocide, several women’s civil society organizations restarted their prewar activities. Many organizations began by taking a census of members and locating surviving
members both inside Rwanda and in exile. In late 1994 and early 1995, they then sent members
to the refugee camps and cities in eastern Zaire and Western Tanzania to convince exiled
members that it was safe to return home.48 In their appeals, the emissaries underscored the need
for everyone to help rebuild the country. An unforeseen benefit of the women’s micro-lending
cooperative, Duterimbere, was that individual accounts at the organization’s savings bank
remained intact unlike accounts in some of the major commercial banks, which had been looted
during the genocide.49 These small savings accounts allowed many women and families to
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restart small businesses destroyed during the war.50 In addition, the organization’s lending
programme gave widows the capital necessary to start new businesses or rebuild their deceased
husbands’ enterprises.
Several new women’s organizations were founded in response to the needs of specific
categories of women. One of the most visible was the Association of the Widows of the April
1994, known by its French acronym AVEGA-Agahozo, which began as an umbrella organization
for groups of genocide widows that had formed at the grassroots level. The national organization
gave the genocide widows greater advocacy power and allowed international NGOs and bilateral
aid organizations to channel humanitarian and development assistance to genocide widows and
their children, known to be extremely vulnerable groups with dire economic, medical, and
psychological needs. Other women’s organizations were imported to Rwanda by long term
exiles who returned to Rwanda after the RPF victory in 1994. One such organization, Club
Mamans Sportives, a sports club that encourages urban middleclass and elite women to ‘get
active,’ was founded in Burundi and imported to Rwanda by returnees.51
One of the key players in the post-genocide period was the women’s umbrella
organization, Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe. Originally founded in 1992, Pro-Femmes grew from
a base of 13 member organizations in the early 1990s to 35 by the end of 1996 and 41 by 2006.52
Pro-Femmes undertook ambitious development and advocacy initiatives, coordinating efforts by
constituent organizations. In the late 1990s, Pro-Femmes’ leadership included a diverse group of
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Rwandan women, including, Hutu, prominent Tutsi widows-of-the-genocide, and Tutsi returnees
from long-term exile in Uganda, Burundi, and DR Congo. Despite the challenges of finding
consensus, the organization focused on issues important to all women, like development,
peacebuilding activities and inheritance rights. In 1996, the organization launched its Peace
Action Campaign, aimed at promoting a culture of peace. Véneranda Nzambazamariya, president
of Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe in the mid to late 1990s, was one of the key initiators of the Peace
Action Campaign; she was recognized for her peace activism and service to women with the
Millennium Peace Prize for Women by UNIFEM and International Alert in 2001.53 The
members of Pro-Femmes, along with the Minister of Gender, Family and Social Affairs, led the
advocacy initiative for the inheritance law, an initiative I explain in more detail below.54
International aid and technical assistance made key contributions to the growth of
women’s civil society organizations. Beginning in the early 1990s, the United Nations entities
and bilateral aid organizations began targeting women and children for assistance in war torn
societies. Rwandan women and women’s organizations benefited greatly from this targeted aid.
The international community provided millions of dollars of funding targeting women’s issues
and women’s organizations. Over $3 million dollars of USAID emergency assistance was
directed through an experimental programme called Women in Transition (WIT).55 The
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programme sought to make small (in USAID terms) grants to local women’s associations across
the country. Between 1995 and 1999, the WIT programme made over 1,800 grants to
associations in eleven of twelve prefectures of Rwanda.56 Many international NGOs developed
and supported gender training programmes (notably Oxfam) for government officials and
leadership training for women elected to office (Women Waging Peace – the Hunt Alternative
Fund).
Despite these significant contributions, the Rwandan women’s movement in the mid to
late 1990s should be viewed as being principally indigenous rather than simply driven by outside
forces. While the Rwandan women’s organizations would not have been able to make as much
of an impact without international aid, the majority of the local organizations did not allow the
agendas of international partners to drive their work plans. Many local women’s civil society
organizations were scrambling to negotiate the complex international aid systems so that they
could become partners of international NGOs or direct recipients of international aid grants. 57
Beyond the financial impact of the international community, the international women’s
movement provided inspiration and technical knowledge to Rwandan women (for instance, the
various International Conferences on Women). Female leaders of civil society organizations in
Rwanda were frequently sent to international conferences or educational exchanges where they
met women from other developing nations who faced similar challenges. They returned
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energized by their discussions with these ‘third world’ feminists.58 In addition, they networked
with feminists from Europe, North America, and Australia who had the resources to provide
continuing assistance to Rwandan women’s organizations.
Collaboration between women in government and civil society: the 1998 ‘inheritance law’
In the 1990s in Rwanda, particularly after the genocide, women’s organizations had
greater space in which to manoeuvre and advocate for women’s rights than many other civil
society organizations, especially than local human rights or indigenous rights organizations. At
the time, women’s organizations were largely perceived as apolitical by the government and the
RPF. Since protecting women’s rights and promoting women’s involvement in the public sphere
and governance were core components of RPF policy, the government did not step in to curtail
the work of women’s organizations as it did with human rights organizations.
To understand the unique position of women’s NGOs in the late 1990s in Rwanda, it is
important to understand something about the RPF’s conceptualisation of the relationship
between civil society and the state. RPF leaders envision civil society as an extension of, rather
than as a counter-balance to, the state. While this vision of civil society is antithetical to current
political and democratic theory, it is a logical extension of the RPF’s African nationalism, which
insists on ‘national unity’ and rejects critiques of government policy by outsiders (such as the
United Nations or European or American governments) as ‘neo-colonialism’.59 My first direct
contact with this vision of civil society came in 2000 when I taught Public Administration
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students at the National University of Rwanda. Several final-year students were examining
various aspects of Rwandan ‘civil society,’ or what they were calling civil society, in their senior
theses (mémoires). I was surprised to learn that these projects were looking at local level
governance structures elected in 1999 rather than at local NGOs, church groups, or agricultural
cooperatives. Rwandan professors at the University did not challenge this definition of state
apparatuses as ‘civil society’; in fact, they perpetuated it in their lectures, in their mentoring, and
in their oversight of senior theses. From this perspective, the ‘correct’ relationship between civil
society and the state is one where civil society serves the ends of the state.
The RPF vision of civil society became codified into law in 2001, when the Transitional
Government passed a law governing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Rwanda,
including local and international NGOs as well as religious institutions. Among other things, this
law gave government ‘authorities broad powers to control the management, finances, and
projects of local and international nongovernmental organizations.’60 Under the law, NGOs and
their missions must be in line with government policy and their work plans must be executing
aspects of the government’s strategic plan in areas related to the NGO’s mission. NGOs who do
not comply can be (and are) denied registration or renewal of their registration. The women’s
movement in Rwanda has been successful when it has aligned itself with the RPF’s vision of
civil society.
An important piece of legislation passed in Rwanda in 1999 exemplifies the collaboration
between women in government and civil society. The legislation, commonly referred to as ‘the
inheritance law,’ was an amendment to the civil code which set up three matrimonial property
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regimes and made it legal for women to inherit property.61 Although referred to as the
‘Inheritance Law,’ this law also gave women full legal rights to enter into contracts, seek paid
employment, own property in their own names and separately from their husbands, and open
bank accounts without the authorization of their husbands or fathers. Passed by the National
Assembly in November 1999, the law dramatically reconfigured customary inheritance practices
and gave girl-children equal rights with boy-children in matters of inheritance. For the
inheritance bill, women’s organizations, the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development
(MIGEPROF), and the Forum of Women Parliamentarians, a caucus of women parliamentarians
created in the mid-1990s, worked closely together in formulating policy, crafting the text of the
bill, and lobbying decision-makers in other ministries and within the inner circle of the RPF,
referred to as the akazu, to pass the controversial bill.
This successful collaboration between women in civil society and government occurred
while the government was not yet a nominal ‘democracy’ and still a power-sharing coalition
between political parties whereby all members of the national government were appointed rather
than elected. According to most observers it was a dictatorship, controlled by the inner circle of
RPF leaders. So, how and why did women succeed in passing this legislation if there was no
democracy? The first, and perhaps most important reason, was that then Vice-President Kagame
and key members of the RPF, including several prominent RPF women (like Rose Kabuye and
Aloysia Inyumba) recognized the need to protect the rights of the thousands of genocide widows
and orphans and thus supported the policy. Second, female leaders in civil society, in the course
of their organizing and providing services to members, had gained enough experience to know
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how to manipulate the state, even a repressive state, to achieve a common goal. As Bauer and
Britton have noted, ‘rather than demonizing the state as an entity of oppression, women are
increasingly moving from resisting the state to using the state’ in Africa.62 Among these key
leaders were many women who had been involved in civil society organizations and political
parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, they knew how to influence policy under a
totalitarian state where the levers of power are hidden from public view. Third, these female
lobbyists couched their advocacy to male audiences in terms of family-oriented, ‘motherist’
politics by appealing to the men’s sense of justice for their own mothers’ and daughters’ rights.63
Fourth, in 1998 the TNP and ministries still included members of political parties other than the
RPF, including the historically Hutu MDR opposition party. Thus, a diversity of views and
interests in Rwandan society was represented in the government at that time. Since the women’s
movement in Rwanda was unified on the inheritance issue, they were able to appeal to
representatives of different political parties with a common message. Following the resignation
of several prominent Hutu politicians in late 1999 and early 2000 (e.g., Prime Minister PierreCelestin Rwigema and President Pasteur Bizimungu) and the dismantling of the MDR political
party in 2003, the view of a narrower segment of Rwandan citizens were represented in the
government. Finally, the presence of women in government (in the ministries and parliament),
along with their attendant ‘stamp of approval’ from the power holders who had appointed them,
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meant that women had access to decision-makers throughout the government.64 Although
women constituted less than 25 percent of parliament at the time, the presence of women in
parliament and elsewhere allowed both women in government and in civil society to advocate for
the inheritance bill in all corners of the government.65 The success of women in these advocacy
efforts suggests that limited forms of democratic participation are possible under an authoritarian
government.
Emasculation of the women’s movement
The Rwandan women’s movement continued to succeed in gaining protections of
women’s rights and participation in government through the Constitutional process from 2001
through 2003. Judithe Kanakuze, a long-term leader in the Rwandan women’s movement, was
appointed to the Constitutional Committee and took an active role in ensuring inclusion of
numerous gender-sensitive clauses in the constitution. The most notable of these was the
establishment of quotas of 30 percent for the inclusion of female representatives in all decisionmaking bodies. As a result, women held 48.8 percent of positions in the National Parliament
following national elections in 2003.
With all the women in governance in Rwanda today, one might think that the situation of
women would be improved. Yet, as Longman argues, it is questionable whether the increased
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representation of women in executive, legislative, and judicial branches has any meaning given
the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Rwandan government.66
In the short-term, the women’s movement in Rwanda has been set back for three main
reasons. First of all, the net result of so many women being included in all levels of government
is that the most vibrant leaders of women’s civil society organizations left to take positions in the
government. According to one woman leader,
When the time came for elections in 2003, everyone was saying to us, ‘You women keep
yelling about women’s rights and including women in government. Now you’ve gotten
what you want so you need to come and be candidates.’ Since 2003, most of the key
women leaders left for the government. Those of us who did not join the government had
to turn our attention to other things, like going back to school or taking care of our private
affairs.67
Thus, many women’s civil society organizations were faced with a vacuum in leadership. The
women who stepped in to take their places were either not as well equipped to advocate on
contentious women’s issues (such as land rights) or were more interested in personal gains,
particularly those who stepped into well-paid staff positions. Many of the younger women who
stepped into these positions were better educated than the women they replaced since they had
university degrees.68 Although these younger women were better educated, they lacked the
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critical experiential knowledge of how to lobby a non-democratic government and how to
negotiate the levers of power. Furthermore, many of these women were RPF cadres so they were
more interested in implementing policy than influencing it.
An example of the impact of this transition on women’s civil society organizations is the
self-destruction of one of the oldest women’s organizations, Réseau des femmes œuvrant pour le
développement rural, between 2003 and 2007. Many of the ‘old-guard’ who had been members
since before the genocide resigned their positions in 2003 to join the government while others
went back to school. When the new Executive Secretary began embezzling funds and taking
credits in the organization’s name, no one noticed. By the time members realized what had
happened, the organization was several millions of Rwandan francs in debt, had lost its
headquarters building, and had to lay off its entire staff.
A final reason the women’s movement has been set back is that women have not found a
unifying issue to rally around since the promulgation of the inheritance law in 1998. Land tenure
and land use are among the most volatile political issues in Rwanda today, and the present
situation poses the risk of widespread violence.69 Given that the vast majority of Rwandan
women are subsistence farmers and that women, and female-headed households in particular, are
among the people most vulnerable to losing access to land, it would seem that land rights would
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be an obvious rallying issue for the Rwandan women’s movement.70 However, the women’s
NGOs and MIGEPROF have refused to define land as a women’s issue since the initial steps to
develop the land policy and law in 1997. When lobbied by LandNet to address the draft land
policy and laws, representatives of MIGEPROF said that land is an issue for all Rwandans, not
just women.71 As a result of LandNet’s advocacy efforts, undertaken without support from
women’s civil society organizations or MIGEPROF, the final version of the 2005 Land Law
stated that the Inheritance Law guaranteed female equality vis-à-vis property, including land. In
practice, however, women face substantial obstacles when attempting to actualize their
inheritance or land rights, and the 2005 Land Law did not offer women any relief and may in fact
make them more vulnerable.72
Given the volatility of the issue, it is likely that women’s NGOs and women in
governance did not define land as a women’s issue in order to avoid coming into conflict with
the interests of the RPF and the akazu. Furthermore, since the majority of women for whom land
is a life and death issue are poor, rural women, the primarily middle-class and urban elite,
women’s civil society organizations and their membership may not have perceived land as a
women’s issue since it was not an issue directly relevant to their leaders. The failings of the
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women’s movement in Rwanda vis-à-vis the land bill demonstrate the limited impact that
increased female participation in governance has had since 2003.
Increased female participation in governance has had a number of negative consequences.
First of all, across the African continent, the engagement of more women in the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches of government, as well as in the grassroots administrative
structures, has resulted in a loss of human capital from the vibrant civil society organizations.73
While younger women with university educations are taking their places, the movement of
experienced women into government has left women’s organizations with fewer experienced
female leaders.74 Given the difficult political terrain, the loss of experienced leaders lessens the
effectiveness of advocacy on hot button issues, like land use, as the ‘new’ civil society leaders do
not have the savoir faire to manoeuvre behind the scenes.
Second, increased female participation in governance risks hindering the cooperation
between women in civil society and women in office—cooperation that was vital in the creation
and passage of the Inheritance Bill.75 In Rwanda, some women feel as if their colleagues who
have been elected to office, accepted a government post, or joined the RPF political party are no
longer engaging in activism on behalf of women’s interests.76 Since 2001, female
Parliamentarians have voted for bills which destroyed the one remaining opposition party, which
gave the President and the RPF powerful tools to root out dissension, which eliminated an
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autonomous civil society, and which eliminated public space for criticism of the government, the
RPF, or their policies.
Another risk of female legislative representation is that it ‘may be used by political
leaders and parties to legitimize their agendas’.77 According to some analysts, the RPF regime
has used female-friendly policies to achieve its own ends. Having designated women’s
representatives in Parliament and other branches of government is a way of ensuring loyal RPF
representatives who are not officially ruling party representatives. Tripp has documented an
analogous situation across the border in Uganda.78 Many Rwandans I spoke with in 2007 voiced
the sentiment that Members of Parliament do not do anything except collect their salaries and
enjoy the other benefits of their position (such as a stipend, a loan for a car, and money for
petrol) and show up occasionally to ‘vote’ on issues that have already been decided within the
RPF. While the factual accuracy of this portrait is difficult to document, it is apparent that both
female and male representatives in government who fail to toe the RPF line are forced to
resign.79
Transformation in Political Subjectivity
Although the female-friendly policies of the 2003 Constitution may not prove to be a
boon to women in the short term, the prospects for meaningful input by women in the long term
remain good. As Aretxaga argues ‘political processes … are en-gendered’ even in contexts
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where women are excluded from the real politics.80 Female engagement with political processes,
whether formal (as in the case of Rwanda) or informal (as in the case of Northern Ireland in the
1970s), transforms not only the political processes but also the constitution of women’s
identities, subjectivities, and agencies. Thus, the long-term potential benefit of greater female
participation in governance in Rwanda is the transformation of women’s political subjectivity
and Rwandan culture.
The presence of women in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government
marks a significant departure for Rwandan society and the collective cultural imagination. These
women’s representatives have transformed what is possible for ‘daughters’ [abakobwa] and
‘wives’ [abagore]. According to custom, daughters and wives were subordinate to (and by
corollary protected by) fathers (or brothers) and husbands. A wife could speak publicly on
behalf of the family in her husband’s (or father-in-law’s) absence, yet she was perceived as his
second and not as an independent, autonomous agent. Whether customary gender roles have
always relegated wives to a secondary position behind husbands is up for debate. As Oyewumi
argues in the case of Yorubaland, the application of the category ‘women’ in Rwanda, and the
resulting perception of females as inferior in post-colonial Rwanda, may be largely a product of
the colonial encounter.81 Whether the subordination of females to males is entirely a result of
colonialism, the work of Jefremovas makes it clear that colonialism weakened the customary
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powers and rights of daughters and wives.82 Yet, in Rwanda today wives and daughters are
accorded the right to speak publicly, whether or not they are elected officials or government
functionaries. While there are still those Rwandans (male and female) who speak against female
equality and who label independent or outspoken women as ‘loud’ or ‘loose,’83 these voices are
no longer met with social silence or tacit approval. Instead, they are pointed out as ‘un-evolved’
points-of-view, which hearken back to the ‘Old Rwanda.’
Second, the inclusion of women in governance has changed public perceptions of women
in governance roles and opened the doors to greater individual freedom for women in other
aspects of their lives. In recent years, several scholars, including myself, have argued that violent
conflict, and the attendant disruptions in gender relations, can provide ‘new opportunities to
articulate debate about gender politics as well as for individual women to live in a different
way’.84 This situation is true of Rwanda in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide when Rwandan
women found themselves in a difficult situation.
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The genocide and civil war brought about a dramatic demographic shift in the
composition of Rwandan society. In the immediate aftermath of violence in 1994, the population
had become predominantly female. Human Rights Watch estimated that 70 percent of the
population inside Rwanda in 1995 was female.85 As internally displaced persons and refugees
returned home, this demographic shift slowly began to equalize. A demographic survey
conducted in late 1996 and early 1997 established that the overall sex ratio (number of males per
100 females) for the Rwandan population was 86, meaning that women constituted 53.7 percent
of the adult population, an abrupt shift from the estimate only 1-2 years earlier.86 While the 2002
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Rwandan National Census reported the overall sex ratio as 91.25 (meaning that 52.2 percent of
the total population was female, compared with 51.2 percent in 1991), the sex ratio for people 17
years or older was 87.07 nationwide, a notably larger gap.87 Although these overall figures may
not sound very dramatic, in specific age brackets in specific communities, the absence of men is
much more notable. For example, in my own census of a rural community in Butare prefecture
in 2001, adult women comprised 55.6 percent of the adult population. Yet in the 40-50 year age
bracket women were 65.4 percent.88 The 2002 Rwandan National Census reported the lowest sex
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ratio (77.94) for those 17 years of age or older in Kibuye prefecture.89 As a result of these
demographic changes, many ‘wives’ and ‘daughters’ found themselves without the ‘traditional’
protection of ‘husbands’ or ‘fathers’.
Beyond these dramatic demographic changes, the harsh material realities of postgenocide Rwanda created an entirely new context for kin and social relations. The civil war and
genocide produced over two million refugees along with hundreds of thousands more internally
displaced persons. The economic and physical infrastructure had been destroyed at every level.
Many survivors had nothing left—no clothes to wear or food to cook, much less a pot in which
to prepare it. Survivors, particularly women, found that ‘traditional’ ways of life and modes of
being were no longer possible.
Following the genocide, many Rwandan women found themselves as heads of household,
whether because their husbands were dead, in exile, in prison, or in military service with the
RPF. According to Rwandan custom, women rely on men for access to the means of livelihood.90
Yet in the aftermath of the genocide, women took on new roles in the domestic and public
spheres that Rwandan society had previously not ascribed to them. These roles included
everyday tasks customarily taboo for women, like putting roofs on houses, constructing
enclosures around houses, or milking cows, and additional roles in society, such as head of

89

Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and National Census Commission, ‘Report on

the Preliminary Results: The General Census of Population and Housing: 16-30 August 2002,’ p. 39 (Table 19).
90

Burnet and Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development, ‘Culture, Practice and Law: Women's Access to Land

in Rwanda,’ p. 11, Human Rights Watch, ‘Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence,’ p. 19.

37

household or government administrator.91 Many Rwandan women took on primary economic
responsibility for their households because their husbands were either absent or unable to do it.
Prior to the genocide, Rwandan law forbid Rwandan women to engage in commercial activities,
enter into contract, or seek paid employment without authorisation from their husbands.92 In
practice, many husbands (and even most husbands in the cities) allowed and even encouraged
their wives to work because it benefited the whole family, but the husbands often controlled the
women’s salaries or profits from commercial endeavours. Female-owned businesses were
vulnerable, in practice and by law, to plunder by their husbands (whether to support their own
businesses, their drinking, or even their mistresses) or to complete takeover.93
With the disruption in gender relations, some women found the freedom to pursue careers
or commercial activities without these risks. Yet, this ‘opportunity’ to challenge customary
notions of womanhood and women’s roles in the family and community should not be portrayed
too rosily, as some journalists and feminist policy analysts have tended to do. For peasant
women in rural areas, the absence of husbands increased the burden of crushing poverty as well
as social isolation. Farming without their husbands’ labour resulted in a heavier workload and
lower yields, as well as reduced social status in the community where no one had the ‘time’ to
hear about or assist with ‘widows’ problems’ as more than one widow described it to me.94 The
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lack of income from husbands’ labour in the cash economy left widows and prisoners’ families
destitute without the necessary cash to pay for health care or school fees. For middle class and
elite women, their new found ‘freedom’ was bittersweet. Even the most successful business
women lamented the heavy burden of bearing sole financial responsibility for themselves and
their children—not to mention the social, emotional, and psychological consequences of
widowhood or single motherhood.95 As time has gone on, the most difficult burden for many has
been solitude. Many female genocide survivors report that the perpetrators who killed their
husbands and children spared the women by saying, ‘You will die from solitude’.96 In 2007, a
widow-of-the-genocide whose two surviving children were away studying abroad wrote me, ‘I’m
becoming old, and I’m bored a lot here in [town where she lives]. I’m beginning to feel bad
being alone.’ The understatement of her phrasing only emphasized her suffering. Another
widow, who had had a series of intermittent, clandestine relationships with married men and
even a Roman Catholic priest, stated her physical needs to me in surprisingly straightforward
declaration, ‘I burn for a man.’ Her expression of physical solitude in a Western idiom sounded
like a direct challenge to Rwandan ideals of chastity and emotional reserve for ‘daughters’ and
‘widows’. The possibility that she could imagine stating her desires so matter-of-factly, in a way
so antithetical to Rwandan cultural ideals of femininity, points to a transformation in
subjectivity.
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A third effect of the inclusion of women in governance structures is the increase of the
numbers of women with leadership and governance experience. Even if their leadership and
governance skills are acquired in a non-democratic system, the same skills will be relevant
should the RPF open the doors to more genuine democratization with meaningful competition
between political parties, a free media, and a civil society with the capacity to counterbalance
state power. Thus, in the long-term greater female representation could pave the way for
meaningful participation of women in a more democratic political system because a great deal of
change in cultural and social conceptions of gender roles manifested in the acceptance of women
in positions of power (like Mayors, local government authorities, or Gacaca judges) as well as
the acceptance of women as independent agents in public fora (such as witnesses in Gacaca
hearings or speakers in government council meetings at all levels).
Conclusions
The lasting repercussions of the 1994 genocide, the material realities of life in postgenocide Rwanda, and the greater representation of women in public life and political office
have promoted a great deal of change in cultural and social conceptions of gender roles. With
these changes has come a greater acceptance of women in positions of authority and of women
as independent agents in the public sphere. Through its policies, the RPF has linked gender
equality to nationalism. As a whole, the top-down gender initiatives of the RPF have had a
positive impact on gender equality and have transformed the collective cultural imagination:
‘wives’ and ‘daughters’ have a wider range of socially circumscribed agencies in the ‘New
Rwanda’, and they are conceiving of themselves and their agencies in the world differently.
Increased female political participation in Rwanda represents a paradox in the short-term: as
their participation has increased, women’s ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In

40

the long-term, however, increased female representation in government could prepare the path
for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy because of a transformation in
political subjectivity.
This case of an authoritarian, single-party state pushing for greater gender equality
highlights a few key points relevant to political theory and democratization studies as well as to
the increasingly female political representation across Africa. First of all, even in an
authoritarian state, policy can be influenced by interest groups (such as women) who have access
to decision-makers and who have the political savvy to operate the hidden levers of power.
Second, the emphasis on elections in lieu of other aspects of democratic governance may reduce
rather than increase the capacity of interest groups to shape policy. Third, top-down gender
initiatives, even when implemented by authoritarian regimes, can lead to transformations in
political identities, subjectivities, and agencies. Finally, these transformations in political
subjectivity may pave the way for effective engagement in democratic governance should it
emerge.
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Table 1. Women in Rwandan Parliament (1961 – 2008)
Total Members

Female Members

N

N

%

1961

First Legislative Assembly‡

44

0

0

1965

Legislative Assembly‡

47

1

2.1

1969

Legislative Assembly‡

47

0

0

1973

No legislative assembly existed‡

NA

NA

NA

1982

National Development Council‡

64

4

6.3

1983

National Development Council‡

70

9

12.9

1988

National Development Council‡

70

11

15.7

1994

Transitional National Parliament‡

70

8

11.4

1994

Transitional National Parliament

$

NA

10

NA

1999

Transitional National Parliament$

NA

NA

<25

2002

Transitional National Parliament*

74

17

23

2003

Transitional National Parliament$

NA

NA

25.7

2003

Parliament (both houses)$

106

48

45

2003

Chamber only$

80

39

48.7

2006

Parliament (both houses)†

104

44

42.3

2006

Chamber Only†

78

35

44.8

2008

Senate€

26

9

34.6

2008

Chamber¥

77

36

46.8

2008

Parliament (both houses) €,¥

103

45

43.6

Notes: Bolded text indicates composition after national elections.
‡
According to Aloys Muberanziza, 'L'acces des femmes aux fonctions parlementaires au
Rwanda', Dialogue, 231 (2003), pp. 3-25.
$
According to Timothy Longman, ‘Rwanda: Achieving Equality’, p. 144.
*
According to Elizabeth Powley, ‘Strengthening Governance: The Role of Women in
Rwanda's Transition', p. 27.
†
Compiled from Rwanda Parliament website, Electronic document, available at
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/, (5 October 2006).
€Compiled from “Abasenateri” Umutwe wa Sena website, available at
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/SE/rw/compo/index.htm (21 February 2008).
¥Compiled from “Abadeputi” Umutwe wa deputi website, available at
http://www.rwandaparliament.gov.rw/CH/rw/compo/index.htm (21 February 2008).
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